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1. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, nineteen terrorists hijacked four commercial
airliners loaded with civilian passengers and proceeded to crash two of them
into the World Trade Center in New York City and one into the Pentagon in
Washington, D.C. The fourth plane never made it to its intended target as it
was brought to a fiery crash in the plains of Pennsylvania by its brave
passengers.
The stories of the tragedy and terror of September 11,2001 were written in
the blood of more than 3000 innocent lives from over ninety countries and in
the rubble of the financial and military centers of the world's remaining
superpower. America and Americans were joined by nations and peoples
across the globe united in grief and horror at the atrocities committed on that
fateful day.
The Member States of the United Nations immediately convened the
General Assembly and the Security Council on September 12, 2001, while the
United Nations Headquarters itself was still under high alert, to express the
international community's unanimous and unequivocal condemnation of the
terrorist attacks and its universal sense of condolence and sympathy to the
government and people of the United States of America. In Resolution 1368,
the Security Council called on "all States to work together urgently to bring to
justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks" and
also called upon "the international community to redouble their efforts to
prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation and full
implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions and
Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1269."'
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S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1368 (2001)
[hereinafter Resolution 1368].
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Security Council Resolution 1368 also reiterated the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense under the Charter of the United Nations
2
and stressed that "those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held account-
able"' 3-a clear reference to AI-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Subsequently, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolutions 1373
and 1377' to establish a consensus framework to combat international
terrorism as a threat to international peace and security. 5 Resolution 1373
directed States to "[a]fford one another greatest measure of assistance in
connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the
financing or support of terrorist acts" and "[p]revent the movement of terrorists
or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of
identity papers and travel documents."6 Resolution 1373 also called upon
States to intensify and accelerate the exchange of operational information and
intelligence and to increase ratification and enforcement of existing conven-
tions relating to terrorism.7 Most significantly, the Security Council empha-
sized "the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional,
regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this
serious challenge and threat to international security."' Finally, the Security
Council established a Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor compliance
with these obligations and obliged all Member States to report to the
Committee within ninety days from the adoption of Resolution 1373.'
The Security Council confirmed the foregoing in a declaration on the global
effort to combat terrorism, adopted in Resolution 1377 on November 12,
2 Id.
3Id.
' Press Release, United Nations Security Council, Security Council Unanimously Adopts
Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution, U.N. Doe. SC/7158 (Sept. 28, 2001), at http://www.
un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm; PressRelease, United Nations Security Council,
Security Council Calls on All States to Intensify Efforts to Eliminate International Terrorism,
U.N. Doc. SC/7207 (Nov. 12, 2001), at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/200 I/sc7207.doc.
htm.
' See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES11373
(2001) [hereinafter Resolution 1373] (calling on States to work together to suppress the threat
to international peace and security posed by terrorism); S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess.,
4413th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doe. S/RES/i 377 (2001) [hereinafter 1377] (declaring a global effort to
combat terrorism).
6 Resolution 1373, supra note 5, at 2.
7 Id. at 3.
8Id.
9 Id.
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2001.10 The Resolution 1377, among other things, affirmed that "a sustained,
comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration
of all Member States of the United Nations, and in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations and international law, is essential to combat the scourge
of international terrorism."" It also stressed that "continuing international
efforts to broaden the understanding among civilizations and to address
regional conflicts and the full range of global issues, including development
issues, will contribute to international cooperation and collaboration, which
themselves are necessary to sustain the broadest possible fight against
international terrorism."' 2
Thus, within a period of two months, the Security Council, ostensibly
acting on behalf of the international community, took unprecedented, proactive
steps to address the new global paradigm resulting from the events of
September 11. The success of the "global response to global terror," as
formulated by the Security Council in resolutions 1368, 1373, and 1377,
however, rested upon a fundamental assumption: the Security Council would
serve as the central forum of cooperation, decision-making, compliance
monitoring, and enforcement. The efficacy of this global counter-terrorism
paradigm requires at least three elements: a common definition of the threat,
a common perception of the existence of a threat, and a common effort to
combat the threat.
II. OBSTACLES TO A COMMON DEFINITION OF THE THREAT
The international community has sought to arrive at an agreed definition of
"terrorism" for several decades, but such a definition has been elusive.
Competing agendas in the effort to ensure respect for the law of self-defense,
for legitimate armed struggle against foreign occupation, and for the sanctity
of civilian life have thus far plagued the work of international efforts to adopt
a general anti-terrorism convention and have impeded a consensus on the
scope and applicability of any such convention. The international community
has come close to creating a working definition of "terrorist acts" in the
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism adopted by the
General Assembly in Resolution 49/60 of December 9, 1994 3 (as supple-
'0 Resolution 1377, supra note 5, at 1.
" Id. at 2.
12 Id.
"3 G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (1994)
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mented in Resolution 51/210 of December 17, 1996),"4 and more recently in
Article 2(1) of the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 54/109
of December 9, 1999.'"
The Declaration provides, inter alia, that
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror
in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for
political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever
the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological,
racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked
to justify them.'6
Article 2(1) of the International Convention refers to
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and
as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; 7 or (b) Any
other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of
[hereinafter Resolution 49/60].
14 G.A. Res. 51/210, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (1996).
is G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (1999)
[hereinafter Resolution 54/109].
16 Resolution 49/60, supra note 13, at 3.
" The Annex to the International Convention Contains nine treaties: the Convention for the
Suppression ofUnlawful Seizure ofAircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105;
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23,
1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S., 177; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973,
28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention against the Taking of Hostages,
Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101, 18 I.L.M. 1419; Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474, 27 I.L.M. 627; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678
U.N.T.S. 201,27 I.L.M. 668; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201, 27
I.L.M. 669; and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec.
15, 1997, 149 U.N.T.S. 256,37 I.L.M. 249. Resolution 54/109, supra note 15, Annex at 13-14.
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such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or
to compel a Government or an international organization to do or
to abstain from doing any act.18
In resolutions 1373 and 1377, the Security Council condemns and
criminalizes terrorist acts without providing a concrete definition or explicit
reference to the aforementioned definitions. The absence of such definition
stems from the international community's similar failure to agree on a general
anti-terrorism convention and its incremental resort, since the early 1970s, to
the adoption of a series of treaties, including those mentioned above, in order
to deal with specific crimes which have been deemed to constitute terrorist
acts.
Notwithstanding the success in arriving at a working definition as set out
in Article 2(1)(b) of the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, the international community's failure to agree on the
scope and applicability of a general anti-terrorism convention revolves
primarily around a standoff between those who seek to carve out a military
exception for the regular armed forces of States and those who argue in favor
of an exception for national liberation movements and other contexts of
foreign occupation. The few proponents of the latter exception wish to include
attacks on civilians and other non-combatants within the scope of legitimate
armed struggle in the context of national liberation movements and resistance
against foreign occupation. An overwhelming number of States readily and
correctly reject any legitimization of the use of force against civilians but some
amongst them have gone as far as to argue that even attacks on military
targets-such as soldiers and occupying forces-fall outside the scope of what
is otherwise generally accepted as legitimate armed struggle. Both positions
seem to contradict the underlying premise of the explicit reference in Article
2(1)(b) to attacks on civilians and any other persons "not taking an active part
in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict."' 9 Based on that working
definition, the use of force against active military targets in a situation of
foreign occupation cannot be deemed to be a terrorist act any more than attacks
on civilians, regardless of the cause or context, can ever be justified as
legitimate armed struggle.
A lack of respect for immunity from attack for civilians and other protected
persons and property instills a state of terror in mankind. Most would agree
18 Id. at 3.
19 Resolution 54/109, supra note 15, at 3-4.
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that it is a soldier's raison d'etre to be exposed to the possibility of violent
death in carrying out his or her military duty. None would be surprised if the
armed forces of an occupying power were met with armed resistance from
elements of the occupant population. While soldiers and occupying powers
have the right to defend themselves against such attacks within the parameters
prescribed under international law, neither can claim an inherent immunity
from attack. A civilian at home, at work, on a bus, on a plane, or in a caf6 or
disco, on the other hand, should be and must be immune from such attack and
exempted from the fear of such an eventuality. It is the distinction between
combatants and non-combatants that lies at the heart of the sanctity of civilian
life in armed conflict. In the same manner as the Geneva Conventions prohibit
the use of force against civilians on the basis of such distinction, 20 so too can
an international legal instrument distinguish between legitimate armed struggle
and terrorist acts.
In the meantime, and despite the universal rejection of the terrorist attacks
of September 11, the absence of an international consensus on a general
definition of terrorism has continued to impede the international community's
efforts to adopt a general anti-terrorism convention and has hampered global
efforts to combat terrorism in all its forms.
III. CHALLENGES TO A COMMON PERCEPTION OF THE
EXISTENCE OF A THREAT
In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, the
international community came together in an unprecedented manner and
forged a mutually acceptable plan of action to combat international terrorism
as a threat to international peace and security. The unanimity with which
Security Council resolutions 1368, 1373, and 1377 were adopted reflected a
universally shared and genuine recognition that it would be necessary to work
together to respond to and combat the scourge of international terrorism. The
unity of Member States was manifested in frozen bank accounts across the
globe, the capture or elimination of several Al-Qaeda cells and operatives on
the basis of shared intelligence, and most visibly in the uncontested use of
force against Al-Qaeda training camps and the dismantlement of the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan.
21 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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President Bush's State of the Union address in January 2002,21 commonly
referred to as the "Axis of Evil" speech, was a turning point in the global war
against terrorism in many ways. The speech and the policy announced therein
appeared to signal a move away from the international focus on the global
threat personified by Osama bin Ladin and AI-Qaeda, the known perpetrators
of the massive terrorist attack of September 11, in favor of a return to familiar
battles against old and sovereign foes: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Less
obvious and far more troubling was a shift from established multilateral
institutions, including the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), which were playing a central role in the pacification
and political transition in Afghanistan, to unilateral and preemptive use of
force supported by loose, ad hoc coalitions.
The Axis of Evil speech also broadened the scope of terror to be fought.
In his first speech after September 11, a September 20 address to a joint
session of Congress and the American people, President Bush defined the
scope of war on terror as being against terrorist groups of global reach.22 In
this respect, Al-Qaeda stood uniquely and universally recognized. Also, when
President Bush declared, "[e]ither you are with us, or you are with terrorists,' 23
the choice was clear and the world overwhelmingly and steadfastly stood with
the United States. In the Axis of Evil speech, however, the President put all
terrorists-local, regional, and international-and their "sponsors" on notice,
thereby injecting the tensions of arriving at a common definition for terrorism
as described in Part II. Thus, when President Bush changed focus and declared
war against North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, the international community's choice
was more difficult and the response more divided.
The message conveyed in President Bush's Axis of Evil speech shattered
the unanimity of the Security Council. The Security Council failed to adopt
further resolutions on the subject of terrorism until October 2002, and then
only to condemn the terrorist attacks in Bali, Indonesia,24 to condemn the
21 President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State
of the Union (Jan. 29, 2002), in 38 WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRES. DOCS. 133. A version of the
address is also available at the White House website at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/01/printI20020129-11 .html.
22 President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United
States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 (Sept. 20, 2001), in 37 WKLY.
COMPILATION OFPRES. DOCs. 1347, 1348. Aversion of the address is also available at the White
House website at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html.
23 Id. at 1349.
24 S.C. Res. 1438, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4624th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1438 (2002).
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hostage crisis in Moscow, the Russian Federation,25 and to condemn the
attacks against Israeli citizens and property in Kikambala and Mombasa,
Kenya.26
These attacks, and the consensus which emerged around Resolution 1441,27
which strengthened the weapons inspection regime in Iraq,28 facilitated the
adoption of resolutions 1452, 1455, and 1456, which provided further
measures for the international effort to combat terrorism.29  This new
consensus was short-lived, however, as it was once again shattered by the
initiation of hostilities in Iraq in March 2003.
Under the UN Charter, the use of force is unlawful except (a) in the event
of an attack in self-defense under Article 5130 and/or (b) pursuant to Security
Council authorization under Chapter VII upon a determination of the existence
of a threat to international peace and security. 31 Prior to the initiation of
hostilities in Iraq, the United States and the United Kingdom advanced
alternative arguments for the use of force. The two powers argued (a) that the
war in Iraq was justified through self-defense, because Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction represented an imminent danger: the Hussein regime would itself
use the weapons or would supply the weapons to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist
groups. Alternatively, they argued (b) that the war was authorized by Security
Council Resolution 1441,3 for Iraq's breach of that resolution and resolutions
25 S.C. Res. 1440, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4632d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1440 (2002).
26 S.C. Res. 1450, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4667th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1450 (2002).
27 See Press Release, United Nations Security Council, Security Council Holds Iraq in
'Material Breach' of Disarmament Obligations (Nov. 8, 2002), at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2002/sc7564.doc.htm (announcing the Security Council's unanimous adoption of
Resolution 1441).
2 Resolution 1441 set up an enhanced inspection regime for a full and verified completion
ofthe disarmament process established by Resolution 687 in 1991. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR,
57th Sess., 4664th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002) [hereinafter Resolution 1441].
29 S.C. Res. 1452, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4678th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1452 (2002)
[hereinafter Resolution 1452] (adjusting SecurityCouncil provisions regarding the frozen funds
of the Taliban and members of the Al-Qaeda organization); S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. SCOR, 58th
Sess., 4686th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (2003) [hereinafter Resolution 1455] (improving the
implementation ofmeasures against the Taliban and members of the Al-Qaeda organization and
their associates); S.C. Res. 1456, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4688th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456
(2003) [hereinafter Resolution 1456] (adopting a declaration on the issue of combating
terrorism).
10 U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
3' U.N. CHARTER, ch. VIII.
32 Resolution 1441, supra note 28, at 2-3.
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dating back to 1990,"3 leaving Iraq a continuing threat to its neighbors, the
region, and the international community.
Neither argument gained favor in the Security Council, among a majority
of States, or most visibly in the streets of major cities around the world. The
war in Iraq, unlike the war in Afghanistan, was divisive and controversial. The
contention that a threat emanated from Iraq was not determined by the Security
Council, confirmed by the weapons inspection regimes, or widely shared in the
international community. The imminence of any such threat was broadly
rejected and the coalition supporting the United States and United Kingdom
in prosecuting the war lacked either breadth or depth of composition.
In failing to achieve a common understanding of the Iraqi threat, a common
perception of its existence and imminence, or a common effort against its
source, the war in Iraq not only failed to fall comfortably within the framework
of the international effort to combat terror, but by challenging the international
will as embodied by the Security Council, by undermining multilateral
institutions and systems of cooperation, and by diverting resources and troops
away from continuing efforts to dismantle and apprehend Al-Qaeda cells and
operatives, the war in Iraq arguably has undermined the global war on
terrorism and threatened the international consensus required to successfully
and effectively sustain it. Iraq has, or at least threatens to, become the
breeding ground of terror.
IV. ELEMENTS OF A COMMON EFFORT TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERROR
The elements of a common effort to combat the threat of international
terrorism are found in existing counter-terrorism conventions34 and Security
Council resolutions, in particular, resolutions 1269, 1373, 1377, 1452, 1455
and 1456. 3" While States must be held to account for direct and/or indirect
support of terrorism and for illegal proliferation of nuclear and other non-
conventional weapons of mass destruction, the war against terrorism cannot be
successfully waged if it is understood as a war against sovereign nations. As
a matter of conception, the terrorist enemy must be recognized as a non-state
actor who has called into question the monopoly on the international use of
13 Id. at 1-2.
34 See, e.g., supra note 17.
" See S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4053d mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (1999);
Resolution 1373, supra note 5; Resolution 1377, supra note 5; Resolution 1452, supra note 29;
Resolution 1455, supra note 29; Resolutionl 1456, supra note 29.
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force vested in sovereign States under the classical definition of international
relations. To combat terrorism, it is therefore necessary to identify terrorists
and terrorist groups as individual criminals with networks of organized crime.
It is necessary to institutionalize cooperation among States to share intelligence
and exchange information on the whereabouts, communications, and planning
activities of known terrorists. It is imperative to improve transnational
apparatuses to detect, monitor, and control their cross border movements and
money transfers; to freeze their assets and sources of funding; to locate and
dismantle, if necessary by the use of force, their training camps and
safehouses.
Where they have combined and pooled their -technological and human
intelligence resources, Member States have achieved tangible successes in the
surveillance, deterrence, and capture of terrorists and terrorist cells. In fact,
the United States' success in capturing many of the high-level Al-Qaeda
leaders and operatives was indeed possible through joint operations and
initiatives with countries including, but not limited to, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Morocco,. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Such international
cooperation can also enhance individual and collective efforts to build up
defenses, detection capacities, and response capabilities at home and abroad.
While each State retains the inherent right of self-defense,36 the global
threat of terror requires strong multilateral institutions to harness international
will and resources, ensure coherent decision-making, and enable effective
enforcement action. The threat of nuclear terrorism, in particular, requires
transparent inspection, verification, and safeguards regimes in order to secure
nuclear materials, halt proliferation activities, and ensure the legal and
peaceful uses of nuclear technology. While not perfect, the United Nations
system and the regional arrangements are indispensable allies in this effort.
V. CONCLUSION: WINNING THE WAR AGAINST AL-QAEDA
The moral underpinnings of an effective counter-terrorism strategy require
the reaffirmation of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants
both in the conduct of the war against terrorism and in arriving at a general
definition of terrorism. The legality of the use of force must be measured not
only in its motivation but also in its execution. The massive loss of civilian
life is reprehensible whether callously disregarded as "collateral damage" or
viciously intended as the target of a terrorist act. The thousands of civilians
36 U.N. CHARTER ch. VII, art. 5 1.
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killed in Afghanistan and Iraq were as innocent as the 3000 civilians murdered
in the United States on September 11 and must be counted as victims, albeit
of a different crime. Attacks on military targets, be they active combatants of
a regular army, an occupying force, or a militant insurgency, cannot be legally
or morally equated with attacks on civilians and civilian populations centers.
Reinforcing principles of international humanitarian law. will serve to
consolidate international efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism. When
neither side can use the atrocities of the other to justify their own, the primacy
of the rule of law can deepen understanding among civilizations in the mutual
search for peace and justice.
To that end; the international community must seriously address, and if
possible resolve, the global issues and regional conflicts that plague the
international system. The fight against Al-Qaeda, in particular, requires a full
grasp of the grievances which drive Osama bin Ladin's self-proclaimed 'jihad"
against the foreign occupation of Arab and Muslim lands and his aspirations
to replace what he perceives to be dynastic and corrupt regimes in the region
with ultra-fundamentalist Wahabi rulers. While many share his contempt for
the current regimes in the region and his objection to Israeli occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza, his outrage against the sanctions against Iraq, and his
opposition to the United States' presence in the Persian Gulf, few embrace the
despicable means by which he has chosen to achieve his unacceptable bid for
power. While the heinous acts of. the terrorists who purport to act in
vindication of those who are aggrieved by the perceived failures and injustices
of the international system cannot be justified, the resolution of the issues and
conflicts which the international system has thus far been unable to address
would serve to deprive the terrorists of the ability to manipulate and harness
the support and sympathy of those so aggrieved.
In order to successfully and effectively combat the scourge of terrorism, it
is necessary to achieve a common definition and perception of the terrorist
threat, and punish the planners, sponsors, and perpetrators of their terrorist
acts. The latter requires the legitimacy of concerted and internationally
authorized action, the stability of necessary but gradual democratic reforms,
and the nobility of bringing an end to foreign occupation and enshrining the
self-determination of the recognized peoples of the world.
In the absence of proof of the existence of weapons of mass destruction or
other threats emanating from Iraq, the invasion of Iraq cannot be justified as
self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Having
been waged without Security Council authorization and against the will and
without the support of the majority of the international community, the war in
2004]
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Iraq contravenes the primacy of the role of the Security Council in the
maintenance of international peace and security and the obligation of Member
States, under Article 2(4) of the Charter, to "refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State."37 In failing to restore security, maintain
law and order and ensure the wellbeing of the Iraqi people, the United States
and the United Kingdom proved unable or unwilling to fulfill their obligations
as occupying powers. The war in Iraq illustrated that an attack on the values
of civilized nations can be waged more fully by their intended "defenders"
than by their would be opponents. The unprovoked invasion and subsequent
occupation of Iraq further fueled the anti-Western sentiment and deepened the
mistrust between civilizations on which Al-Qaeda's propaganda and recruit-
ment feeds. In so doing, the war in Iraq has undermined and arguably
sabotaged the global war on terrorism. For, to successfully and effectively
combat terrorism, the international community must be empowered to restore
peace and security through common and collective efforts, dedicated to
dialogue among civilizations, and committed to achieving security without
sacrificing human rights, humanitarian principles, and the rule of law.
37 U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
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